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but sustained efforts to verify deterrent effects empirically did not begin until the 1960s.
In 1978, the National Academy of Sciences released the report of the Panel on Research on Deterrence and Incapacitation, of which I was a coauthor. The panel's conclusion was guarded but affirmative on the existence of a deterrent effect: "The evidence certainly favors a proposition supporting deterrence more than it favors one asserting that deterrence is absent" (Blumstein, Cohen, and Nagin 1978, p. 7). The report was followed by a widely cited review in this series by Philip J. Cook that reached a similar but less guarded conclusion: "my assessment is that the criminal justice system, ineffective as it may seem in many areas, has an overall crime deterrent effect of great magnitude" (1980, p. 213). In this essay I review the current state of the evidence on deterrence but with a focus on research since 1980, identify important gaps in knowledge, and suggest a research agenda for the outset of the twenty-first century.
Deterrence research has evolved in three distinctive and largely disconnected literatures-interrupted time-series, ecological, and perceptual studies. Interrupted time-series studies examine the effect of targeted and specific policy interventions such as police crackdowns on open-air drug markets. Here the evidence suggests that such interventions have at least a temporary effect, although decay is commonplace (Sherman 1990 ).
The ecological studies use natural variations in crime rates and sanctions levels across time and space as the test bed for estimating deterrent effects. These studies search for a negative association between crime rates and sanction levels that can plausibly be interpreted as a deterrent effect. I am convinced that a number of studies have been successful in doing this (e.g., Sampson and Cohen 1988; Kagan 1989; Levitt 1996) .
Prior to 1980, those two kinds of studies were the mainstay of the deterrence literature. Since that time, another large deterrence literature has emerged that focuses on the links between perceptions of sanction risk and severity to self-reported crime and delinquency. The data for these studies are assembled from surveys. Thus, perceptual studies differ from ecological and interrupted time-series studies both in terms of the unit of observation-individuals rather than placesand the source of the data-surveys rather than official records. With few exceptions, the perceptual studies find that self-reported criminality is lower among people who perceive that sanction risks and costs 4 Daniel S. Nagin level to S2. The response implied by curve A is small. Accordingly, the response would be difficult to detect and likely not sufficient to justify the change as good policy.' By comparison, the response depicted in curve B is large, thus more readily detectable, and also more likely to be justifiable as good policy.
While the distinction between absolute and marginal deterrence is useful, it implies an underlying analytical simplicity of the relationship between crime rates and sanction levels that belies the complexity of the phenomenon. Contrary to the implicit suggestion of figure 1, no one curve relates sanction levels to crime rates. The response of crime rates to a change in sanction policy will depend on the specific form of the policy, the context of its implementation, the process by which people come to learn of it, differences among people in perceptions of the change in risks and rewards that are spawned by the policy, and feedback effects triggered by the policy itself (e.g., a reduction in private security in response to an increase in publicly funded security). Further, the magnitude and possibly even the direction of the response to a policy may change over time. Thus, while I am convinced that a number of studies have credibly identified marginal deterrent effects, it is difficult to generalize from the findings of a specific study because knowledge about the factors that affect the efficacy of policy is so limited. Specifically, I see four major impediments to making confident assessments of the effectiveness of policy options for deterring crime.
First, while large amounts of evidence have been amassed on shortterm deterrent effects, little is known about long-term effects. Evidence from perceptions-based deterrence studies on the interconnection of formal and informal sources of social control point to a possibly substantial divergence between long-and short-term effects. Specifically, these studies suggest that the deterrent effect of formal sanctions arises principally from fear of the social stigma that their imposition triggers. Economic studies of the barriers to employment created by a criminal record confirm the reality of this perception. If fear of stigma is a key component of the deterrence mechanism, such fear would seem to depend on the actual meting out of the punishment being a relatively rare event. Just as the stigma of Hester Prynne's scarlet "A" depended on adultery being uncommon in Puritan America, a criminal 1The shape of this response curve is also instructive for making another point: just because the response to an increase in sanctions from S1 to S2 is small, it does not follow that response to a reduction in sanction levels from S, will be small. record cannot be socially and economically isolating if it is commonplace. Policies that are effective in the short term may erode the very basis for their effectiveness over the long run if they increase the proportion of the population who are stigmatized. Deterrence research has focused exclusively on measuring the contemporaneous effects of sanction policies. Long-term consequences have barely been explored.
The second major knowledge gap, which was also emphasized by Cook more than fifteen years ago, is that we know little about the connection of risk perceptions to actual sanctions policy. The perceptual deterrence literature was spawned by the recognition that deterrence is ultimately a perceptual phenomenon. While great effort has been committed to analyzing the links between sanction risk perceptions and behavior, comparatively little attention has been given to examining the origins of risk perceptions and their connection to actual sanction policy.
For several reasons this imbalance should be corrected. One is fundamental: the conclusion that crime decisions are affected by sanction risk perceptions is not a sufficient condition for concluding that policy can deter crime. Unless the perceptions themselves are manipulable by policy, the desired deterrent effect will not be achieved. Beyond this basic point of logic, a better understanding of the policy-toperceptions link can also greatly aid policy design. For instance, nothing is known on whether the risk perceptions of would-be offenders for specific crimes are formed principally by some overall sense of the effectiveness of the enforcement apparatus or by features of the apparatus that are crime specific (e.g., the size of the vice squad or the penalty for firearms use). If it is the former, seemingly targeted sanction policies will have a generalized salutary effect across crime types by heightening overall impressions of system effectiveness. If the latter, there will be no such generalized effect. Indeed would-be offenders may substitute nontargeted offenses for targeted offenses (e.g., committing burglaries in response to increased risk for robbery).
Third, the effect of specific policies-for example, increasing the number of police-will depend on the form of their implementation across population units. Yet estimates of the deterrent effect of such policies from the ecological literature are commonly interpreted as if they apply to all units of the population from which they were estimated. In general this is not the case. Rather, the estimated deterrent effect should be interpreted as the average of the "treatment" effect across population units. For instance, the deterrent effect of more po-lice in any given city will depend on a host of factors including how the police are deployed. Consequently, the effect in any given city will not be the same as the average across all cities; it may be larger, but it could also be smaller. Similarly, it is not possible to make an allpurpose estimate of the effect of prison on crime. There are many ways to increase prison population by a given amount, ranging from broadbased policies such as across-the-board increases in sentence length to targeted policies like "three-strikes" statutes. It is likely that the magnitude of the preventive effect will vary materially across these options. The implication is that, even though there are credible estimates of average deterrent effects of at least some broad classes of policies, the capacity to translate the average estimates into a prediction for a specific place is limited. This is a major shortcoming in the evidence because crime control is principally the responsibility of state and local governments. It is the response of crime to policy in that city or state that is relevant to its population, not the average response across all cities and states.
A fourth major gap concerns the link between intended and actual policy. Generally, laws are not administered as intended. For example, mandatory minimum sentences can be circumvented by plea bargains or selective prosecution. Commonly, the popular press and political process attributes the noncorrespondence to malfeasance. The reality is more complicated but not well understood. A better understanding of the technology of sanction generation is required to delineate the boundaries of feasible policy as prescribed. Here is how this essay is organized. Section I provides an overview of the principal points that I make about the interrupted time-series, perceptual-deterrence, and ecological studies. The principal findings of these literatures are summarized in Sections II, III, and IV. In Section V the links between prescribed and actual policy are examined, and Section VI offers conclusions. Figure 2 depicts the interrelationship of three variables that form the focus of this essay-crime rates (C), sanction levels (S,), and policy (P,) (e.g., number of police). Each variable is subscripted by t to account for changes over time. The major points I want to make are motivated by the interrelationship of these variables.
I. Overview of the Interrelationship of Crime Rates,

Sanctions, and Policy
The first point involves the observation that spawned the perceptual ship of policy to crime. In so doing these studies have treated the intervening policy-to-perceptions linkage, depicted by the arrow from policy to perceived sanction level, as a black box. While these studies generally find that policy has at least a temporary effect on crime and thereby somehow influences perceptions, the dearth of evidence on the policy-to-perceptions linkage is a major gap in knowledge of the etiology of deterrence. As is discussed in Sections II and III, such knowledge would be of great value in designing effective deterrence policies. Another important dimension of the policy-to-perceptions linkage concerns how quickly policy affects perceptions. Figure 2 includes a pointer from time t -1 to time t as a reminder that policy, perceptions, and behavior are connected over time. Perceived sanctions at time t, S,, are likely to be a function not only of actual sanction policy at t, Pt, but also of sanction policy in prior periods, P,-1, Pt-2, .... Yet nothing is known about the most basic aspects of the process by which sanction perceptions adjust to policy change-the speed with which it occurs and the mechanism by which people form their perceptions.
Relatedly, sanction perceptions may also differ across two locations with the same sanction policy because of differences in population characteristics and context. For instance, the effect of policing tactics on risk perceptions may depend on the population characteristics of a neighborhood, such as ethnic and age composition.
Another of my major points stems from the simultaneous relationship between crime rates and sanction levels that is depicted in figure 2 (i.e., arrows going in both directions between St and C,). In econometric parlance such variables are called "endogenous." The deterrent effect of sanctions is reflected in the arrow from St to Ct. But the level of crime may also affect sanction levels. For instance, increased crime may overwhelm the criminal justice system's capacity to process cases. This effect is depicted by the arrow from Ct to St. To partial out the deterrent effect requires that the analysis also take into account the effect of crime rate on sanction level, whatever its cause. In Section IV, I discuss a few studies that in my judgment have plausibly dealt with the simultaneity problem. I also discuss important limitations to the generalizability of these studies. The final arrow links crime to policy. For a sanction policy to be effective it must be credible. Credibility in turn depends on the capacity of the criminal justice system to administer official policy. Ironically, this capacity in turn depends on the level of crime, the very phenomenon that the policy is intended to affect. The interplay of policy, credible threat, and crime rate is the subject of Section V.
II. Interrupted Time-Series Studies
Interrupted time-series studies examine the effect of targeted policy interventions such as police crackdowns or effectuation of statutes changing penalties. The best-designed studies attempt to incorporate important features of a true experiment-a well-defined treatment regime, measurement of response before and after treatment, and a control group. Two classic studies of this genre are Ross's studies of the effect on drunk driving of the British Road Safety Act (Ross 1973 ) and of Scandinavian-style drunk driving laws (Ross 1975 drunk-driving interventions this is evidenced by a reduction in fatalities in which a driver is intoxicated or in drug market crackdowns by reduced dealing. One exception may be increases in sentence severity that are not accompanied by at least the maintenance of the status quo level of certainty. If judges or juries believe that the penalties are too harsh, they may respond by refusing to convict guilty defendants with the result that the policy increases rather than deters the targeted behavior. Indeed, Ross (1982) concludes that efforts to deter drunk driving with harsher penalties commonly fail for precisely this reason. I return to this conclusion in Section V. Sherman and Ross are also in agreement that the effect is generally only transitory: the initial deterrent effect typically begins decaying even while the intervention is still in effect. However, in some instances the decay is not always complete even following the end of the crackdown. Sherman (1990, p. 10) offers some useful nomenclature for labeling these effects: "initial deterrence decay," which he describes as the reduction in the deterrent response as "potential offenders learn through trial and error that they had overestimated the certainty of getting caught at the beginning of the crackdown," and "residual deterrence," which is a crime suppression effect that extends beyond the intervention until offenders learn by experience or word of mouth that "it is once again 'safe' to offend."
There are at least two explanations for deterrence decay and residual deterrence. One is incorporated directly in Sherman's definition qua explanation of these two concepts-would-be offenders initially overestimate the increase in sanction risk posed by the intervention. Deter-rence decays as they learn that they were fooled. This explanation is also endorsed by Ross. A related but distinct explanation is also suggested by Sherman (1990) . It involves a concept from behavioral decision theory called "ambiguity aversion." Expected utility theory assumes that probabilities of outcomes are known whereas subjective expected utility theory does not make this strong assumption. Rather, subjective expected utility allows that people may have a subjective probability distribution over the unknown probability. Camerer and Weber (1992) observe that it is hard to think of a real-world decision problem where probabilities are known with certainty. This observation certainly applies to crime. As discussed in the prior section, the probability of successful completion of a crime depends on the kind of crime committed, the circumstances in which the crime is committed, the skill of the offender, and a litany of other contingencies.
In subjective expected utility theory, this distinction is analytically unimportant because the expected (mean) value of the subjective probability distribution is substituted for the single objective probability in expected utility theory. The problem is that people do not behave as if they make this simple substitution. They seem to care also about the variance of the distribution. Specifically, people prefer gambles in which they know the probabilities exactly to "ambiguous" gambles where they only know the distribution of probabilities. To illustrate, consider the following two lotteries: (1) a 0.5 probability of winning $10 and 0.5 probability of winning nothing, versus (2) a two-stage lottery where, in the first stage, the probability of winning $10 is determined by a draw from a 0-1 uniform distribution and, in the second stage, the lottery is "played-out" based on the probability drawn from the first stage. In both lotteries the chance of success is 0.5, but the evidence is overwhelming that people prefer lottery 1 to lottery 2 (Camerer and Weber 1992). This aversion to uncertainty about the relevant probability is what behavioral decision theorists call "ambiguity aversion," a label that Camerer and Weber attribute to Daniel Ellsberg (1961). Ambiguity aversion offers an explanation for initial deterrence and its subsequent decay that is distinct from the overreaction hypothesis. The difference is illustrated with an extreme example. Suppose that intervention did not alter people's mean estimate of risk, as depicted in postintervention subjective risk distribution. Even though the mean of the pre-and postintervention risk distributions are the same, the ambiguity aversion hypothesis predicts an initial increase in deterrence. As people learn more about the actual effects of the postintervention enforcement regime, the variance of the postintervention risk distribution will decrease. This reduction in ambiguity in turn will result in deterrence decay. I contrast these two explanations for deterrence decay because they again serve to illustrate how little is known about the formation of sanction risk perceptions. We currently have no basis for distinguishing these two explanations, and the question of which is the more credible explanation is more than academic. Sherman (1990) has suggested that initial deterrence can be made permanent by constantly experimenting with novel police deployment strategies or enforcement priorities. The idea is to avoid stability and predictability. The large body of evidence suggesting that ambiguity aversion is deeply embedded in human decision making supports Sherman's recommendation. Even when subjects are made aware of the equivalence of gambles with the same expected probabilities, ambiguity aversion persists; ambiguity avoidance does not appear to be a decision response that is easily "un-learned." However, if the initial deterrence is attributable to an overreaction to the effect of the intervention on actual risk, it seems less likely that people will be repeatedly fooled. In panel-based studies respondents were typically interviewed on an annual cycle. In analyzing these data researchers have examined the relationship of self-reported offending in the year period between survey administrations to sanction risk perceptions at the outset of the measurement period. Generally, these studies have found only weak evidence of deterrent-like associations Paternoster et al. 1982 Paternoster et al. , 1983a Paternoster et al. , 1983b .
III. Perceptual Deterrence Studies
Researchers using panel data focused on the relationship of behavior between years t and t + 1 to risk perceptions at the outset of the year t to avoid the problem of causal ordering: is a negative association a reflection of the deterrent effect of risk perceptions on crime or of the effect of criminal involvement on risk perceptions (Greenberg 1981 (Clarke 1995) . Perceptions of sanction threats are affected by the context in which the crime is committed, such as the presence of witnesses, escape opportunities, and so on, and these perceptions materially affect behavior. Unless the circumstances are well described, questions about sanction risk are ill-2 The principal weakness of the scenario approach is that an expressed intention to offend is not synonymous with actual performance. Fishbein and Ajzen (1975) argue that there will be a close correspondence between intentions and behavior when intentions are measured with the same specificity as the behavior that is being predicted, when there is stability of the expressed intention, and when the individual is able to willfully carry out the intention. In my judgment the scenarios used in my own research meet these criteria, but still I must acknowledge that the link between intentions and behavior remains problematic. 
B. The Formation of Sanction Risk Perceptions
The perceptual deterrence literature was motivated by skepticism that perceived and actual sanction threats were tightly linked. Thus it is curious that perceptual deterrence researchers have given only modest attention to the factors influencing risk perceptions and to the dynamic processes by which they are formed. Consider the experiential argument of Paternoster and colleagues: why is it that those without experience in offending have higher risk perceptions than those with experience? Minor and Harry (1982), Tittle (1980) , and Paternoster and colleagues attribute it to the naivete of inexperienced offenders who overestimate the effectiveness of enforcement apparatus. Tittle (1980, p. 67) describes this naivet6 as the "shell of illusion" about the consequences of law breaking. These arguments are plausible but remain untested hypotheses.
Embedded in these explanations is the presumption that perceptions are updated based on experience. As Paternoster et al. observe: "People who engage in illegal acts without getting caught may be expected to lower their estimate of the probability of getting caught" (1983a, p. 458). They are suggesting that offenders have prior estimates of decision-relevant quantities, such as the risk of getting caught, which they do not abandon completely based on new data. Instead they update their prior estimates based on the new information. Thus, their current estimate is an amalgam of the prior estimate and information gleaned from recent experience. Presumably the experience of being caught should result in an increase in perceived probability of apprehension but not to a probability of one, which defines certain apprehension, only to some higher probability estimate.
The process that I have just described of updating rather than com- by experimentally varying scenario conditions (e.g., length of the drive home) and examining the effect of such variation on perceived risk (e.g., the probability of arrest for drunk driving). Results have been mixed. For offenses such as date rape and drunk driving, we find little evidence of risk perceptions being affected by context, but for tax evasion the link was strong. Perceptions of the risk of detection increased with the amount of noncompliance and varied by type of noncompliance (e.g., were higher for deductions than for cash income). For tax compliance, at least, perceptions mirrored the realities of the enforcement process. Kagan (1989) provides a complementary perspective on the findings for tax evasion. He argues that the visibility of income to the IRS exerts an enormously powerful effect on compliance rates. Compliance rates are very high for very visible sources of income such as wages, dividends, and interest for which the IRS receives information reports from payers. Compliance declines substantially for less visible sources of income for which the IRS does not receive information reports but for which there are other practical methods for tracing the income like bank or business records. Examples of this sort of income are proprietorship and partnership incomes. Finally, compliance rates are negligible for income sources like cash income earned in the informal, underground, and illegal economic sectors, which are virtually untraceable. As Kagan points out, visibility is simply an evocative synonym for detectability. For highly visible sources of income it is easy for the IRS to assemble the accounting information necessary to prove noncompliance; it comes to them on a computer tape. Thus, the threat of detection is very high. People recognize this and compliance is correspondingly high. For invisible sources of income it is extremely costly to assemble the required accounting information to prove noncompliance, and here again people seem to respond accordingly, by reporting very little of such income.
The literature on the formation of sanction risk perception is small and narrow in scope. Arguably, measuring the linkage between sanction policies and sanction risk perceptions is of secondary importance to measuring the linkage between sanction policy and behavior. Knowing the effect of policy on risk perceptions serves only to clarify the basis for the relationship of policy to behavior but has little value in and of itself. This argument assumes that the linkage between policy and behavior can be firmly established. In fact, evidence on the policyto-behavior linkage will never be "airtight" even if it is based on data from an experiment. For instance, suppose it was found that a policy of presumptive arrest for spousal assault was associated with a decline in various indicators of spousal abuse in the population at large. One interpretation of such a finding is that it reflects a general deterrent effect. But if there were no evidence that men were generally aware of this policy, the deterrence interpretation would be undercut. Alternatively, if survey evidence showed a general awareness of the policy, the case for the deterrence interpretation would be bolstered.
The dearth of evidence on the policy-to-risk-perceptions linkage also leaves unanswered a key criticism of skeptics of the deterrent effects of official sanctions. Even if crime decisions are influenced by sanction risk perceptions, as the perceptual deterrence literature strongly suggests-absent some linkage between policy and perceptions-behavior is immune to policy manipulation (Jacob 1979) . In this sense behavior lacks rationality, not because individuals fail to weigh perceived costs and benefits, but because the sanction risk perceptions are not anchored in reality. Cook (1979) Assembling evidence on sanction risk perceptions will not be easy, particularly for groups including a large representation of marginal offenders, individuals who are neither strongly committed to crime nor to legal conformity. But the research of Horney and Marshall (1992), which was based on a sample of high-risk offenders, and successes in research on situational deterrence and tax evasion make me confident that the effort will be profitable and that headway is possible.
C. The Linkage between Formal and Informal Sanction Processes
In Early perceptual deterrence studies did not consider the connection between formal and informal sanctioning systems, but a review by Williams and Hawkins (1986) prompted a broadening of the agenda to consider this issue. In a nutshell, their position was this: community knowledge of an individual's probable involvement in criminal or delinquent acts is a necessary precondition for the operation of informal sanction processes. Such knowledge can be obtained from two different sources: either from the arrest (or conviction or sentencing) of the individual or from information networks independent of the formal sanction process (e.g., a witness to the crime who does not report such knowledge to the police). Williams and Hawkins observe that deterrent effects may arise from the fear that informal sanctioning processes will be triggered by either of these information sources. They use the term "fear of arrest" to label deterrent effects triggered by the formal sanction process and the term "fear of the act" to label deterrent effects triggered by information networks separate from the formal sanction process. The crux of their argument is that all preventive effects arising from "fear of arrest" should be included in a full accounting of the deterrent effect of formal sanctions. For example, if an individual refrains from committing a criminal act because she fears that an arrest will bring the transgression to the attention of others, and thereby jeopardize valued social relationships, the preventive mechanism is ultimately the result of formal sanctions and, therefore, "part of the general deterrence process" (Williams and Hawkins 1986, p. 561).
I concur, and much of my scenario-based research confirms their argument. This research has consistently found that individuals who report higher stakes in conventionality are more deterred by perceived risk of exposure for law breaking. My most salient finding in this regard is for tax evasion. Civil enforcement actions by tax authorities are a private matter unless the taxpayer appeals the action. Because tax authorities are scrupulous about maintaining this confidentially, for civil enforcement actions noncompliers are gambling only with their money, not their reputations. In Klepper and Nagin (1989a, 1989b) a sample of generally middle-class adults were posed a series of tax noncompliance scenarios. The scenarios laid out the essential features of a tax report-income from different sources, number of exemptions, and various deductions. We then experimentally varied the amount and type of noncompliance (e.g., overstating charitable deductions or understating business income) across tax-return line items. We found that a majority of respondents reported a nonzero probability of taking advantage of the noncompliance opportunity described in the scenario. Plainly, our respondents were generally willing to consider tax noncompliance when only their money was at risk. They also seemed to be calculating; the attractiveness of tax noncompliance gamble was inversely related to the perceived risk of civil enforcement.
The one exception to the rule of confidentiality of enforcement interventions is criminal prosecution. As with all criminal cases, criminal prosecutions for tax evasion are a matter of public record. Here we found evidence of a different decision calculus; seemingly all that was necessary to deter evasion was the perception of a nonzero chance of criminal prosecution. Stated differently, if the evasion gamble also involved putting reputation and community standing at risk, our middleclass respondents were seemingly unwilling to consider taking the noncompliance gamble.
This finding also provides some fresh perspective on the old question whether it is the certainty or the severity of punishment that is the greater deterrent. If the social and economic costs of punishment are strictly proportional to the punishment received-for example, if the cost to the individual of a two-year prison term is twice that of a one-year sentence-certainty and severity will equally affect the decision making of a would-be offender who is an expected utility maximizer. This is because expected cost is simply the multiplicative product of certainty, P, and severity, S. The value of the product, P * S, is equally affected by proportional changes in P or S. For example, the effect on expected value of a 50 percent increase in P is the same as a 50 percent increase in S. However, my tax evasion research suggests that people do not perceive that costs are proportional to potential punishment. Instead, it seems that they perceive that there is fixed cost associated with merely being convicted or even apprehended if it is public record.
While my tax evasion research does not pin down the specific sources of these costs, other research on the effect of a criminal record on access to legal labor markets suggests a real basis for the fear of stigmatization (Freeman 1991; Grogger 1992; Lott 1992; Waldfogel 1994; Nagin and Waldfogel 1995; Bushway 1996). Freeman estimates that a record of incarceration depresses probability of work by 15 percent to 30 percent; Waldfogel (1994) estimates that conviction for fraud reduces income by as much as 40 percent; and Bushway (1996) concludes that even an arrest for a minor offense impairs access to legal labor markets at least in the short run. I emphasize the link between formal and informal sanctions because over the long run a policy may erode the foundation of the deterrent effect-fear of stigmatization. For an event to be stigmatizing it must be relatively uncommon. As I pointed out earlier, Hester Prynne's ostracism depended on a proscribed behavior, adultery, being a rare event in Puritan America. To illustrate how a policy may cannibalize the basis for its effectiveness, consider the following example. Suppose a policy had the effect of increasing the probability of imprisonment for committing a crime, P(I), by 10 percent and this policy was effective in reducing the number of offenders, N, by 5 percent. Ceteris paribus, is it reasonable to assume this reduction in N can be sustained over the long run? I think not. In steady state, the incarcerated population, I, equals (P(1) * S) * (N * X), where S is the average time served in prison and k is the average rate of offending. The two product terms, P(1) * S and N * k, respectively, can be interpreted as the expected prison price per crime committed and the total number of crimes committed. Thus, their product equals the size of the incarcerated population. Assume for simplicity that the 10 percent increase in P(I) has no effect on X or S. Under these circumstances, the 5 percent reduction in N will reduce the crime rate by 5 percent. However, it will also increase the incarcerated population by 5 percent-N declines by 5 percent, but P(1) increases by 10 percent. The increase in prison population will in turn result in an increase in the proportion of the population with a prison record. Here lies my reservation about the sustainability of the 5 percent reduction in crime. If in fact fear of stigmatization is a prominent factor in a full accounting of the deterrent effect of formal sanctions, this policy may erode the basis for its effectiveness by making prison records more commonplace.
More generally, such erosion in effectiveness seems likely to occur when a policy's preventive effect is not sufficiently powerful to reduce crime by enough to reduce rather than increase the proportion of the population with criminal records. To illustrate, suppose that the 10 percent increase in P(1) reduced N by 15 percent-that is, the elasticity of N with respect to P(1) is 1.5-each 1 percent increase in P(1) reduces N by 1.5 percent. For an elasticity of 1.5, both crime rate and prison population would decline, the former by 15 percent and the latter by 5 percent. In this case, the 15 percent reduction in crime may be sustainable. Indeed, it may even increase over time because the policy decreases rather than increases the population rate of criminal records.
These examples illustrate that the long-term preventive effect of a policy may depend critically on the magnitude of the response. If the elasticity of the crime rate with respect to the sanction policy variable is great enough to reduce the proportion of the population that is stigmatized, the effect may be sustainable. However, if the policy increases the proportion stigmatized, the deterrent effect is less likely to be sustainable. My concern about stigma erosion also provides a complementary argument in support of Braithwaite's plea for sanctioning systems that reintegrate rather than isolate punished offenders. In Crime, Shame and Reintegration, he argues that conscience is a more potent deterrent threat than punishment by the criminal justice system (Braithwaite 1989 ). In Braithwaite's view, pangs of conscience depend on the individual's social integration. Therefore formal sanction processes that do not reintegrate the punished exacerbate misconduct. Here I am suggesting that reintegration may serve to preserve deterrent effects that depend on stigma. Research that models and calibrates the long-term feedback effects of sanction policy is urgently needed.
IV. Ecological Studies
The obstacles to making valid causal inferences from analyses of natural variations are many-incomplete specification of relevant causal factors, measurement error, unmeasured persistent heterogeneity, and endogeneity of regressors (i.e., simultaneously determined regression variables), to name just a few. In the case of deterrence studies, the endogeneity problem, described in Section II, stands out as probably the most important and certainly the most salient obstacle to making inferences about the deterrent effects. To isolate the deterrent effect requires that the analysis also take into account the effect of crime rate on sanction level. This requires the imposition of so-called identification restrictions. There are many forms of identification restrictions, but the most common is the assumption that some factor or set of factors affects only one of the endogenous variables of interest. Thus, to identify the deterrent effect of sanctions on crime requires that the statistical model assume that some factor, such as court orders to reduce prison overcrowding, directly affects sanction levels but only affects crime through its effect on sanction levels. A major focus of the 1978 academy report (Blumstein, Cohen, and Nagin 1978) and my contributions to its commissioned papers (Fisher and Nagin 1978; Nagin 1978) was the veracity of the restrictions that were imposed. Accordingly, a primary focus of my review is the strategies that have been used to deal with simultaneity. A second major focus is the interpretation of the estimated deterrent effect of a specific policy lever. I argue that, while the extant evidence provides useful guidance on the average effect of specified policies across all implementations, it is of limited value for predicting the effect of any specific implementation of the policy. Two broad classes of ecological analyses are considered-studies of the deterrent effect of prison and of the police.
A. The Effect of Prison Population on Crime Rate
Between 1974 and 1994 the number of people incarcerated in state or federal prisons grew at an average annual rate of 7.9 percent; the result has been a near quintupling of the prison population-218,000 to 1,016,000 (Maguire and Pastore 1996) . Whether this run-up in prison population has materially affected the crime rate has profound implications for public policy, yet there has been surprisingly little analysis of this question. The few studies that have been done produce a range of conclusions from that of Zimring and Hawkins (1995) that the effect has been negligible to an estimate by Levitt (1996) The paucity of studies is probably attributable to the problem of identification that I wrote about nearly twenty years ago (Nagin 1978) . For any given level of sanction threat-average incarceration time per crime committed-more crime will generate larger prison populations. Studies attempting to measure the effect of prison population on crime rate that do not take into account the mutual interaction of C(P) and P(C) depicted in figure 4 will confound the preventive effect with the effect of crime on prison populations. To see this, consider first panel a. This panel depicts the effect of a policy that increases average punishment per crime. An example is a policy that curtails parole boards powers. Such policies will result in a rightward shift of P(C) that results in an increase in the prison population from po to pi, which is accompanied by a reduction of the crime rate from co to cl. In the parlance of econometrics, the exogenously induced shift of P(C) "identifies" C(P) under the assumption that the influence causing the shift in P(C) does not directly affect crime behavior by also shifting C(P). In the real world, C(P) is also shifting. Suppose a change in demography, such as an increase in the number of young men, causes a rightward shift in C(P). Such a shift could induce the same po-pl increase in the prison population depicted in panel a, but here the increase in prison population is accompanied by an increase, not a decrease, in crime rate. Consequently, studies that do not take into account the mutual determination of crime rate and prison populations are likely to underestimate the preventive effects of prison sanctions because the preventive effect depicted in panel a will be contaminated by the influence of increases (decreases) in the prison spawned by exogenous increases (decreases) in the crime rate as depicted in panel b.
This identification problem is not limited to technically sophisticated multivariate regression studies. Quite to the contrary. Any approach that simply associates crime rates with prison population will suffer from the contamination problem. This includes seemingly straightforward approaches intended to appeal to our common sense, such as graphical comparisons of crime rates and prison population and comparisons of average changes in crime rates and in prison population.
At least one study has plausibly dealt with the simultaneity problem. Levitt (1996) Figure 5 is a two-dimensional taxonomy of sanction policies affecting the scale of imprisonment. One dimension labeled "Type" distinguishes three broad categories: policies regulating certainty of punishment, such as laws requiring mandatory imprisonment; policies influencing sentence length, such as determinate sentencing laws; and policies regulating parole powers. The second dimension of the taxonomy, "Scope," distinguishes policies that cast a wide net, such as a general escalation of penalties for broad categories of crime, compared to policies that focus on targeted offenses (e.g., drug dealing) or offenders (e.g., "three-strikes" laws). 
Scope
B. The Effect of Police on Crime Rate
The largest body of evidence on deterrence in the ecological literature focuses on the police. The earliest generation of studies on the deterrent effect of police examined the linkage of crime rate to measures of police resources (e.g., police per capita) or to measures of apprehension risk (e.g., arrests per crime). These studies were inadequate because they did not credibly deal with the endogeneity problem (Nagin 1978; Wilson and Boland 1978) . If the increased crime rates spur increases in police resources, as seems likely, this endogeneity must be taken into account to obtain a valid estimate of the deterrent effect of those resources. By the same logic depicted in figure 4, if the endogeneity is not taken into account, the estimate of the deterrent effect of police resources is likely to be underestimated. Alternatively, if the focus is on the effect of the arrest per crime ratio (hereafter, the arrest ratio), failure to properly account for endogeneity may overstate the deterrent effect. Here the argument is that increased crime may swamp police resources with the arrest ratio declining as a consequence. Wilson and Boland (1978) conducted the first study that in my judgment plausibly identifies the deterrent effect of the arrest ratio. They argued that the level of police resources per se is, at best, only loosely connected to the apprehension threat they pose. Rather, the crucial factor is how the police are mobilized to combat crime; Wilson While the estimate from the reduced-form equation does not isolate the deterrent effect of the arrest ratio, it is actually more policy relevant. It measures the effect of the policy lever that the police can directly control. The police cannot directly manipulate the arrest ratio, but they can choose how aggressive to be in suppressing incivilities.
A second important innovation in Sampson and Cohen is that they estimate not only a population-wide deterrent effect but disaggregate this effect across segments of the population-white juveniles, black juveniles, white adults, and black adults. They do this by using arrest rates as surrogate measures of demographic group-specific offense rates. They find a negative deterrent-like association between aggressiveness and arrest rate for all groups, but they also find significant differences by race and age in the magnitude of the effect. For robbery, at least, adults seem to be more deterred by police aggressiveness than juveniles, with black adults seemingly more deterrable than white adults.
Because the results for specific demographic groups are based on arrest rates, they must be qualified in a number of obvious ways. Notwithstanding, the efforts of Sampson and Cohen to disaggregate are laudable and where feasible should become standard in deterrence studies. The differences in response across demographic groups identified in this study are still another reminder that regression coefficients are only measuring an average effect. A priori we would not expect all people or segments of the population to respond in the same way to police aggressiveness. Indeed there are good reasons for believing the response will vary in the population. For instance, I am not surprised that adults seem to be more deterrable than juveniles because the consequences of apprehension are graver for adults.
Two other noteworthy studies of the effect of police on crime are Levitt (1997) Compliance rates are high for income sources subject to information reporting; taxpayers know that the Internal Revenue Service can easily detect nonreporting of such income, so cheating is uncommon. Stated differently, the threat of detection is credible because the cost to the Internal Revenue Service of projecting the threat is low relative to the revenue gain that is returned. The result is not only high rates of compliance but also negligible enforcement costs to the Internal Revenue Service precisely because cheating is infrequent. At the other end of the compliance spectrum is cash income. Here the Internal Revenue Service cannot project a credible threat because costs are high relative to gain. As a result, compliance rates are low, but so are enforcement expenses. The Internal Revenue Service makes no substantial effort to enforce compliance because it is not worth the candle. Taxpayers know this, which is precisely why they cheat with impunity.
Another factor that will affect credibility is the size of the would-be offender population: those who could conceivably be motivated to offend. If this population gets too large, it may overwhelm the system's capacity to project a credible enforcement threat. The proliferation of abusive tax shelters during the 1970s and 1980s seems to have overtaken the Internal Revenue Service's capacity to effectively regulate them. This consideration was a major factor in the near abolition of tax shelters in the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (Nagin 1989).
The key lesson of these models of strategic interaction is that a sanction threat cannot be effective unless it can be administered economically. While the specific forms of the models of strategic interaction between taxpayers and the tax collector are not transferable to capturing the interaction between the criminal justice system and would-be criminals, the concepts of credible threat and strategic interaction are applicable. For instance, consider "three-strikes" type statutes that threaten draconian punishments to individuals with multiple convictions. The credibility of such sanction threats to repeat offenders is likely to be undermined in at least two ways. First, competition among elected officials to be toughest on crime creates pressure to widen the population of repeat offenders either by broadening the types of offenses that count as "strikes" or reducing the number of "strikes" to be subject to the penalty enhancement. This political version of "king of the mountain" dilutes the economic feasibility of such supposedly targeted policies by widening the net of applicability. The penalty enhancement is simply too costly to impose on too broad a segment of the offender population. My bet is that offenders come to know this and respond accordingly. Second, draconian penalties increase the incentives for defendants to demand trials rather than plea bargaining.
The result may be that the criminal justice system will be overwhelmed-again with the effect of making the threatened sanction a paper tiger just as was the case with the Rockefeller Drug Law of the 1970s.
Another important factor that is likely to be important in determining the capacity of the criminal justice system to translate policy into a credible threat is perceptions of fairness. If the threatened penalty so offends the sensibilities of juries, they may engage in jury nullification and refuse to convict. Alternatively, prosecutors may themselves nullify the case by dropping or altering charges. Indeed Andreoni (1991) makes just this argument and advances a model predicting that the probability of conviction will be inversely related to statutory penalties. In Andreoni (1995), he goes on to provide evidence that higher penalties may so reduce probability of conviction that the deterrent effect of the penalty enhancement is nullified. His finding is reminiscent of Ross's (1976) conclusion that tough penalties for drunk driving were ineffective because they were not administered as intended and of Tonry's (1995) account of the unwillingness of juries and judges to enforce the litany of capital offense laws in eighteenth-century England. In summary, effective use of sanction policy levers to deter crime requires that the policy be administered as intended, yet experience demonstrates policies are commonly not administered as planned. Research on sanction policy implementation is fragmentary and incomplete. To define the boundaries of feasible policy we must gain a better understanding of the process of sanction generation.
VI. Conclusions Our knowledge about deterrent effects is vastly greater than in 1980 but, as is so often the case, the more we learn the more we come to appreciate that prior conceptions of the key questions were oversimplified. Thus, while I am confident in asserting that our legal enforcement apparatus exerts a substantial deterrent effect, four major knowledge gaps limit our capacity to make confident predictions about what works in specific circumstances: First, it is necessary to know about more-than-average effectiveness; we need a better understanding of how and why responses to policy vary across time and space. Second, analysis must go beyond estimating only short-term consequences to calibrating long-term effects. Third, knowledge about the relationship of sanction risk perceptions to actual policy is virtually nonexistent; such knowledge would be invaluable in designing effective crime-deterrent policies. Fourth, research on the linkage between intended and actual policy is fragmentary; a more complete understanding of the process of sanction generation is necessary for identifying the boundaries of feasible policy. This then is the outline of my agenda for research on deterrence for the outset of the twenty-first century.
